Abstract. Distance bounding protocols become important since wireless technologies become more and more common. Therefore, the security of the distance bounding protocol should be carefully analyzed. However, most of the protocols are not secure or their security is proven informally. Recently, Boureanu and Vaudenay defined the common structure which is commonly followed by most of the distance bounding protocols: answers to challenges are accepted if they are correct and on time. They further analyzed the optimal security that we can achieve in this structure and proposed DBopt which reaches the optimal security bounds. In this paper, we define three new structures: when the prover registers the time of a challenge, when the verifier randomizes the sending time of the challenge, and the combined structure. Then, we show the optimal security bounds against distance fraud and mafia fraud which are lower than the bounds showed by Boureanu and Vaudenay for the common structure. Finally, we adapt the DBopt protocol according to our new structures and we get three new distance bounding protocols. All of them are proven formally. In the end, we compare the performance of the new protocols with DBopt and we see that we have a better efficiency. For instance, we can reduce the number of rounds in DB2 (one of the instances of DBopt) from 123 to 5 with the same security.
Introduction
Some important applications such as NFC-based payments, RFID access cards in our daily lives provide services according to the user's location. Relay attacks are serious threats against these applications. For instance, if someone makes a payment with a card on a malicious device then the device can relay to a fake card which is paying for something more expensive [13] . Similarly, a malicious person can open a car by relaying the communication between the wireless key and the car.
In [2] , the fact that the speed of communication cannot be faster than the speed of light is used to detect relay attacks. Then, Brands and Chaum [7] introduced the notion of distance bounding (DB) protocols where a prover proves that he is close enough to a verifier. Simply, in distance bounding protocols, the verifier determines the proximity of the prover by computing the round trip communication time in challenge/response rounds. The proximity proof is disincentive against relay attacks. The literature considers the following threat models:
-Distance Fraud (DF): A malicious prover far away from the verifier tries to convince him that he is close enough. -Mafia Fraud (MF) [12] : A man-in-the-middle (MiM) adversary between a far away honest prover and a verifier relays or modifies the messages to make the verifier accept. -Terrorist Fraud (TF) [12] : An adversary tries to make the verifier accept with the help of far away and malicious prover without gaining any advantage to later pass the protocol on his own. -Impersonation fraud (IF) [1] : An adversary tries to impersonate the prover to the verifier. -Distance Hijacking (DH) [11] : A far away prover takes advantage of some honest, active provers to make the verifier accept.
Some of the distance bounding protocols [7] [8] [9] 15, 18, [20] [21] [22] have been broken since either their security were not proven formally or they do not have any security proofs. Amongst existing distance bounding protocols, only the SKI protocol [3] [4] [5] , the Fischlin-Onete (FO) protocol [14, 23] and the DBopt protocol [6] are formally proven to be secure against all above threats.
Boureanu and Vaudenay [6] formalize the threat models and propose a new distance bounding protocol DBopt which has three concrete instances DB1, DB2 and DB3. They give the definition of the "Common Structure" for the distance bounding protocols. A DB protocol in common structure consists of three phases: an initialization phase and a verification phase which do not depend on communication time, and a distance bounding phase between them. The distance bounding phase consists of number of rounds. In each round, the prover responds the challenge of the verifier. The verifier checks if the responses are on time and correct. DBopt follows the common structure and all instances have the security proofs against DF and MF. All but DB3 have a security proof for TF. The common structure is defined by four parameters: the number of rounds n, the minimal number of correct rounds τ , the cardinality num c of the challenge set, and the cardinality num r of the response set. The optimal security bounds for DB protocols that follow the common structure are given in [6] . All instances of DBopt have optimal security bounds against MF and all but DB2 have optimal security bounds against DF.
Random delays for the messages (challenges and responses) on both the verifier and the prover side in the distance bounding phase is used for location privacy as discussed in [17, 19] . In this paper, we add random delays only on the verifier side and achieve better security bounds.
The contribution of this paper is as follows:
-We define three new structures for distance bounding protocols. Differently than the common structure [6] , we suggest to add properties that the prover measures time like the verifier and the verifier sends challenge in a time that is randomly chosen. -We show the optimal security bounds for each new structure. Compared to common structure [6] , we obtain better security bounds. -We modify DBopt protocol [6] according to the new structures and have new protocols DBoptSync, DBoptSyncRand and DBoptRand. We prove the security of them against DF, MF and IF (DH and TF resistance are unchanged compared to [6] ). We reach the optimal security bounds for DF and MF for all of them in their respective structure. -We analyse the performance of our new DB protocols and conclude that we have a better efficiency than previous works [3] [4] [5] [6] 14, 23] .
Definitions and Preliminaries
In this section, we recall the formal model of distance bounding protocols from [6] . In a DB protocol, apart from the prover and the verifier, there may exist other participants called adversaries. Each participant has instances and each instance has its own location. P denotes the set of instances of the prover, V denotes the set of the instances of the verifier and A denotes the set of the instances of the other participants.
Definition 1 (Distance Bounding Protocol
Instances of an honest prover run the algorithm P denoted by P (x). An instance of a malicious prover runs an arbitrary algorithm denoted by P * (x). The verifier is always honest and its instances run the algorithm V denoted by V (x).
The other participants are (without loss of generality) malicious. They may run any algorithm without no initialized key. A denotes a participant from A.
The locations of the participants are elements of a metric space.
Communication and Adversarial Model:
The communication and adversarial model of a DB protocol [3] is the following: DB protocols run in natural communication settings. There is a notion of time, e.g. time-unit, a notion of measurable distance and a location. Besides, timed communication follows the laws of physics, e.g., communication cannot be faster than speed of light.
An adversary can see all messages (whenever they reach him). He can change the destination of a message subject to constraints. Namely, a message sent by U at time t to V can be corrupted by A at time
where d is a metric that shows the distance between its inputs. In addition, the adversary may have extra technology to correct the noise of the channel while honest participants cannot have it.
In fact, the adversary has very limited action because of the communication speed. For instance if the adversary relays the messages between the far away prover and the verifier, the responses arrive very late. Similarly if the adversary forces the far away prover for any online help, still he cannot succeed to respond correctly and on time. Basically, the adversary cannot break the laws of physics! In practice, the noise in the communication should be considered. We assume that there is probability of noise p noise in one round of distance bounding phase. Therefore the probability that a number of τ responses are correct and on time in the case of a close-by prover is Tail(n, τ, 1 − p noise ) where:
Definition 2 (DB Experiment
Accordingly, the probability to fail is negligible when n τ < 1 − p noise due to the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound [10, 16] .
We now give security definitions and theorems from [6] that show the optimal security bounds for the DB protocols following the common structure. [6] ). The distance-bounding protocol α-resists to distance fraud if for any distinguished experiment exp(V ) where there is no close participant to V, the probability that V accepts is bounded by α.
Definition 4. (α-resistance to Distance Fraud

Theorem 1 ([6]).
A DB protocol following the common structure with parameters (n, τ, num c , num r ) cannot α−resists to distance fraud for α lower than Tail(n, τ, max(
This is the optimal security bound that a DB protocol can reach against distance fraud. The DB1 and DB3 protocols from DBopt [6] reach this bound. [6] ). We say that a distance-bounding protocol is β-secure if for any distinguished experiment exp(V ) where the prover is honest, and the prover instances are all far away from V (the distance between the prover instances and V is more than B), the probability that V accepts is bounded by β.
Definition 5 (β-secure Distance Bounding Protocol
We recall that β-security captures the threat models MF, MiM and IF [6] .
Theorem 2 ([6]).
A DB protocol following the common structure with parameters (n, τ, num c , num r ) cannot be β−secure lower than Tail(n, τ, max (
This is the optimal security bound that a DB protocol can reach against mafia fraud. All instances of DBopt protocols [6] reach this bound. The important difference between "Common Structure" and "Sync Structure" is that provers now need to measure time since the verifier needs to check if the challenge arrive on time to the prover. Lemma 1. Let exp be an experiment, V be a participant and t 0 be a time. We consider a simulation exp t0 of the experiment in which each participant U stops just before time t 0 +d(V, U ). We denote by View exp t (U ) and View exp t 0 t (U ) the view of participant U at time t in exp and exp t0 , respectively. For any t < t 0 +d(V, U ),
Proof. We prove by induction on t that for all participant U such that
Clearly this is the case at the beginning of the both experiments. If it is the case at any time less than or equal to t − 1, we can now prove it is the case at time t. Let participant U be such that t < t 0 + d(V, U ). We know that View 
If U is at a different location than U , we have t ≤ t − 1 so we can apply the induction hypothesis. Therefore View exp t (U ) = View exp t 0 t (U ) and so the message m is the same in exp and exp t0 . This applies to all instances at the same location as U , since they locally compute the same messages for each other. Hence, View
Lemma 2. Given an experiment, if a message c is randomly selected with fresh coins by a participant V at time t 0 , anyĉ received by a participant U at time
Proof. We apply Lemma 1. c is not selected at all in exp t0 because V stops just before t 0 in exp t0 . Since t 1 < t 0 + d(U, V ),ĉ is the same in exp and exp t0 . c is randomly chosen with fresh coins, soĉ is statistically independent from c. Remark that this bound is an improvement compared to Theorem 2 in the common structure.
Proof. We consider V, a far-away prover P and a MiM A with noiseless communication. A relays the messages between V and P in the initialization and verification phases which are time insensitive. During the challenge phase, A should arrange the response and the challenge time. Since P is far-away, he cannot just relay the messages. Therefore he should guess the challenge and the response before receiving them. We denote that the distance between V and A by d 1 and the distance between A and P by d 2 . So it can do the following strategy:
No-ask Strategy: A can guess the response and the challenge and forward them before seeing them so that they arrive on time.
We assume that A knows the time t 0 that V sends the challenge c and he chooses a distance d ≤ B. He guesses the challenge and sends it to P at time t 0 + d − d 2 so that P receives it at time t 1 where t 1 = t 0 + d. He guesses the response and sends V at time t 0 + 2d − d 1 . V receives the response at time
, the challenge and the response rounds are on time.
As a result, A can be successful on the verification of the challenge and the response time with no-ask strategy if he guesses both the challenge and response correctly. The probability that he passes the verification for one round is 1 numc.numr and so the probability that the V accepts A is Tail(n, τ, 1 numc.numr ). 
DBoptSync with Synchronized Parties
We propose a new distance bounding protocol DBoptSync described in Fig. 3 which uses the ideas in [6] . The assumption here is that the prover P and the verifier V have synchronized clocks.
DBoptSync is a symmetric distance bounding protocol in which P and V share a secret x ∈ Z s 2 where s is a security parameter. The notations are the folllowing: n is the number of rounds, tag is the length of the tag, τ is a threshold, T is the set of all possible time values, q is a prime power.
As in DBopt, we use the function f x which maps different codomains depending on the input.
n and T ∈ T n . The initialization phase of the DBoptSync is the same as in the DBopt protocol [6] . The distance bounding phase is almost the same. The difference is that P saves the each time t We note that the timely condition in DBoptSync implies t i 2 − t i 0 ≤ 2B, which is the only verification done in DBopt [6] . Therefore, the DBoptSync's timely condition is more restrictive.
The responses are computed depending on the concrete instance of b and φ ci . There are three protocols defined in [6] whose instances are given in Table 1 . Hence, DBoptSync has the same instances as well.
Theorem 4 (Security).
Assuming that V and P are synchronized, the DBoptSync protocol with the selection of b and φ as in Table 1 is β−secure,
-(DB1 and DB2) β = Tail(n, τ, 
If , 2 − nonce and 2 − tag are negligible, DB1, DB2 and DB3 are optimal for the security according to Theorem 3.
Proof. The proof starts like in [6] . We consider a distinguished experiment exp(V ) with no close-by participant and no adversary and V accepts with probability p. We consider a game Γ 0 where we simulate exp(V ) and succeed if and only if V accepts P . So, the success probability of this game is p. We reduce Γ 1 , Γ 2 and Γ 3 as in [6] .
We reduce Γ 0 to Γ 1 whose success additionally requires that for every (N P , N V , L μ ) triplet there is no more than one instance P (x) and one instance V (x) using this triplet. Since P (x) is honest and P (x) and V (x) are selecting N P and N V at random, respectively, so the success probability of Γ 1 is at least p − r 2 2 2 − nonce . Γ 2 is the reduction where Γ 1 and its success requires additionally that V does not accept forged tag. f x satisfies the circular PRF assumptions (See Appendix A) as shown in [6] . It means that the tag can be forged with probability + 2 − tag . Therefore the success probability of Γ 2 is at least p− − nonce − (r + 1) − r2 − tag . We now detail the analysis of Γ 3 which differs from [6] . In Γ 3 , P and V never repeat the nonces and use a random function F to select a. So, the distinguished V has a single matching P and these two instances pick a at random. Furthermore, acceptance implies that both instances have seen the same L μ , T, b, c. The acceptance message of V also depends on the correct and timely response and challenge. In the case that V accepts P , P has to receive the challenge c on time and V has to receive the corresponding response r on time for at least τ rounds. Let's denote t i 0 the time when V sends c i , t i 1 the time when P receives c i and t i 2 is the time when V receives r i . Thanks to Lemma 2, the challenge that P (x) receives is independent from the challenge that is sent by V (x), since the challenge c is randomly selected by V (x), the message that P (x) received matches with probability 1 q . Similarly, if we exchange the roles of P and V in Lemma 2 and replace t 0 with t i 1 and t 1 with t i 2 , we can conclude that r that V (x) receives is independent from the response r i that is sent by P (x) as well. The response functions on DB1, DB2 in each round i depends on challenge, a i and
where g is a function (See Table 1 for the details of g) we can assume that a i is randomly selected in GF (q) just when r i is computed. Equivalently, r i is uniformly selected in GF (q) just before being sent. So, r i = r i with probability If φ and b are as in DB3 [6] , we lose r 2 2 2 − nonce from Γ 0 . In Γ 1 , we apply full PRF reduction and lose to obtain Γ 2 with a random function. We lose 2 − tag more to assume that tag is received by V was not forged in some Γ 3 . Γ 3 succeeds with a probability bounded by Tail(n, τ, − nonce + + 2 − tag for DB3.
DBoptSync with Unsynchronized Verifier and Prover
DBoptSync assumes that the prover and the verifier have synchronized clocks. In this section, we discuss the problems of having unsynchronized clocks for P and V in the DBoptSync. Let's say that the time difference between the clocks of the verifier and prover is |δ| 1 . For example, V has time t on his local clock while P has time T = t + δ on his local clock. V sends the challenge at t 0 according to V's local clock and P receives it at T 1 = t 0 + d 1 + δ according to P 's local clock. Then V receives the response at t 2 ≥ t 0 + 2d 1 . So V gets the following result in the verification of timing:
If the prover is close, the inequality |δ| ≤ B − d 1 should be satisfied so that P passes the protocol.
In addition, unsynchronized honest prover and verifier give advantage to the adversary since he is able to do pre-ask (for δ > 0) and post-ask (for δ < 0). Indeed, if the honest prover is far at a distance up to B + |δ| and at least max(B, |δ|), A passes the protocol with probability Tail(n, τ, max(
which is what is described in DBopt [6] . So, the security result of [6] apply to our protocol even if the clocks are not synchronized.
Pre-ask:
A guesses the challenge before it is released and asks for the response to P on time so that he can later on answer. If P and V are synchronized, this strategy never works because A relays the response from P to V where the distance between them is more than B. However the following happens if P and V are not synchronized and δ > 0.
We consider
. V sends the challenge c at t 0 . A guesses the challengeĉ and sends it to P at t A to be determined which is before receiving the challenge from V. P receivesĉ at T 1 = t A + d 2 + δ that is local time of P . P sends response r and A relays it and V receives r at t 2 = t A + 2d 2 + d 1 .
. So the challenge is considered on time.
. So the response is considered on time.
Post-ask:
A guesses the response at the same time he forwards the challenge to P . If P and V are synchronized, this strategy never works because A relays the challenge from V to P where the distance between them is more than B. However the following happens if P and V are not synchronized and δ < 0.
Without waiting the response from P , A guesses response and sends it at time t A . So V receives it at t 2 = t A + d 1 .
. So the challenge is on time.
By selecting
. So the response is on time.
Therefore, there is an attack when the distance between P and V is in between max(B, |δ|) and B + |δ|.
As a result, we have the security bound of Theorem 4 if the distance between P and V is more than B+|δ| even though P and V are not synchronized. However if P is in the distance between B and B + |δ|, we have the weaker security bound as in Theorem 2.
One of the important problems in DBoptSync with unsynchronized P and V is correctness, since the close-by P cannot pass the protocol, when d(P, V ) ≤ B − |δ|. Therefore if the verification fails in DBoptSync, V can do the time verification of DBopt [6] which is checking if t 2 − t 0 ≤ 2B, but in this case we have a weaker security which is as in DBopt. We stress that this does not require to restart the protocol. We rather obtain a variant of DBoptSync which Out V can take 3 possible values: "reject", "DBopt accept", or "DBoptSync accept". Applications can decide if a "DBopt accept" is enough depending on the required security level.
Randomizing Sending Time of the Challenge
We think of a new modification to distance bounding protocols that are in either "Common Structure" or "Sync Structure". Before, we assumed that the sending time t i 0 of the challenge for each round i in distance bounding phase was known by the adversary. Now, we suggest a new modification where the verifier randomizes the sending time t " with parameters (n, τ, num c , num r , Δ) cannot α-resists to distance fraud (DF) for α lower than Tail(n, τ, max(
Proof. We construct a DF following the early reply strategy: A malicious prover guesses the challenge c i or the response r i before it is emitted, and then already sends the response at time T i 1 (We use capital T since the prover does not have to be synchronized with the verifier). Therefore the prover has to guess proper time T in the "SyncRand Structure" since verifier needs to know it to check if the response and challenge are on time. Therefore the probability that prover succeeds the round i is max( 
2B
Δ since he also have to guess correctly c or r. We can conclude that P succeeds at least τ rounds with probability at least Tail(n, τ, max(
Note that in the "Rand Structure", there is no change on the optimal β which is given in Theorem 2. As for the "SyncRand Structure", the new bound is as follows.
Theorem 6.
A τ -complete DB protocol following the "SyncRand Structure" with parameters (n, τ, num c , num r , Δ) cannot be β-secure for β lower than Tail(n, τ, 
B
Δ since he also have to guess correct c and r. We can conclude that P succeeds at least τ rounds with probability at least Tail(n, τ, 1 numc.numr .
B Δ ).
As a result of all the structures, "SyncRand Structure" gives the best optimal security bounds for both β-security and α-resistance. See Table 2 for the review of the optimal bounds for all of the structures. 
))
Tail(n, τ, max(
DBoptSyncRand and DBoptRand with Randomized Sending Time
We construct new distance bounding protocols DBoptSyncRand and DBoptRand. DBoptSyncRand follows the same steps as in DBoptSync and DBoptRand follows the same steps as in DBopt [6] . Differently in both of the protocols, the verifier randomizes the send time t is uniformly distributed (as real numbers) for each round i in the distance bounding phase. In Sect. 5, we consider Δ = 100B. For instance, Δ = 1μs and B = 10ns (this corresponds to 3 m according to speed of light). n rounds take n μs which is reasonable. [6] 
Theorem 7 (Security
-(b and φ as in DB3 [6] ) β = Tail(n, τ, Proof. The proof is the same as Theorem 4 until game Γ 3 . The success of Γ 3 depends on the correct and timely response and challenge. Lemma 2 shows that the challenge and the response have to be independent so that they arrive on time and these independent response and challenge can be correct with probability 1 q 2 (See the proof of Theorem 4). Additionally, the independent challengeĉ is on time when the sending time is randomized, ifĉ is sent on proper time. This proper time can be correct with probability B Δ as showed in Theorem 6. Therefore the probability of one successful round is 
DB1 and DB3 are optimal for the DF-resistance according to Theorem 5, while DB2 cannot reach the optimal bounds for DF.
Proof. We consider distinguished experiment exp(V ) with no close-by participant. Due to the Fundamental Lemma in [6] , the response r i is independent (in the sense of Fundamental Lemma in [6] ) from c i . For DB1 and DB2, r i is correct with probability 1 q . Since r i has to be arrived on time, the proper time has to be chosen. As stated in Theorem 5 the sending time is chosen correctly with probability 2B Δ . So the probability of success in one round i is 
Performance
Three new protocols DBoptSync DBoptSyncRand and DBoptRand have different success probabilities for distance fraud and mafia fraud. DBoptSync and DBoptSyncRand have better bound against mafia fraud compared to DBopt while DBoptRand has the same security against mafia fraud with DBopt. In addition, DBoptRand and DBoptSyncRand have the same and better success probability for distance fraud compared to DBopt but DBoptSync is same with DBopt.
Assuming a noise level of p noise = 0.05 and B Δ = 0.01, we get the results in Tables 3 and 4 . We find τ in terms of rounds n such that Tail(n, τ, 1 − p noise ) ≈ 99 % for τ −completeness. Table 3 shows the required number of rounds for distance fraud i.e. α ≤ s. Table 4 shows the number of rounds required for the security i.e. β ≤ s. We used Theorems 4, 7 and 8 and theorems in [6] to compute the required number of rounds to achieve security level. As we can see in Tables 3 and 4 , we can use DB2 with 5 rounds (instead of 123) in DBoptSyncRand and reach a pretty good security. If synchronized clocks are not realistic, we can see that we have a much better DF-security with DBoptRand with the same number of rounds.
Conclusion
We define new structures for DB protocols which are not used before. The first structure is the "Sync Structure" where the prover measures the time as well as the verifier. We modify the DBopt [6] according to sync structure and we get DBoptSync which has better security against mafia fraud. Then we add new modification which is randomizing the sending challenge time to both "Common Structure" and "Sync Structure" and get the second and third structures "Rand Structure" and "SyncRand Structure", respectively. Similarly, we modify the DBopt and DBoptSync protocols based on these structures and get better security bounds against distance fraud for the DBoptSyncRand and DBoptRand protocols and mafia fraud for DBoptSyncRand protocol. We give the optimal security bounds against distance fraud and mafia fraud for all DB protocols that follows the new structures.
